Some over-enthusiastic Western analysts argue that, given China’s phenomenal rise, Russia may gradually become a Chinese vassal state

English writer and philologist J.R.R. Tolkien saw history as a “long defeat”. Memories of national trauma persist across generations. Chinese leaders often re-evoke the country’s humiliation from the mid-1800s to the early 20th century as the “century of shame”. The historical trauma is, today, the cornerstone of its national identity.

That may be changing now. Like Tolkien, Chinese leaders now see what the literary genius called “glimpses of final victory” within history’s long defeat.

In a quarter century from now, China will be celebrating the centenary of the 1949 Communist revolution. Beijing may see the occasion as a major milestone to reclaim its global triumph and “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”, which President Xi Jinping had proclaimed on assuming office in 2012. Now that US President Trump has torn up the international rulebook in Venezuela and is threatening to take over Greenland, does China see an opportunity to do the same in Taiwan? President Xi’s New Year’s Eve speech offers some insights into Beijing’s vision of what he calls “the reunification of our motherland”.

Central to Xi’s vision is the assimilation of Taiwan and its recognition by the world as part of “One China” ruled by the Chinese Communist Party. Beijing is, of course, not ruling out Taiwan’s peaceful reunification. Some analysts argue that Beijing is no fan of chaos. It likes to play the long game.

No Chinese Communist leader had previously used the phrase “great rejuvenation” either as a symbol or a policy. Some pundits see it as a call to take China back to its former glory at the centre of the world. The Chinese dream has also been invoked as a cornerstone of its philosophical thought. 

The Chinese Dream is President Xi’s “mission statement” and “political manifesto” for the party and the country’s future. Will that dream include reclaiming its lost territories? China’s interpretation of its history is quite problematic. Beijing often claims Mongolia and the Siberian lands in Russia, as these were integral to the Tang dynasty that ruled from 618 to 907.

The collective memory with regard to its humiliation and territorial loss is paramount in Chinese political culture. Henry Kissinger writes in his book On China about Mao laying implacable belief that breakaway regions, like Taiwan, Tibet, Mongolia, Xinjiang, Himalayan border areas, and the eastern edge of Burma, belonged to China.

China’s second rise will have implications for the world, including for Russia. The impact of China’s rise has already been shattering for Russia. But Russia can ill afford to reassess ties with China. Neither can it afford to whittle down its ties, much less to hand in the divorce papers, as it is too dependent on Beijing. 

An article in Eurasia Daily Monitor, a publication of the Washington-based Jamestown Foundation, says that Beijing only supports Moscow to serve Chinese interests, leverage Russian anti-Western narratives in its own propaganda, and treat the Russian Far East as a ‘resource colony’. Some Chinese nationalists have formed a movement, demanding Russia return Vladivostok to China. 

James C. Hsiung, in his book, China into its Second Rise, maintains that China’s first rise (713-1820) holds crucial lessons for its second rise. He believes that China’s current rise will unveil the contours of Pax Sinica. The Institute of China and Modern Asia at the Russian Academy of Sciences, in its report titled “China-2049: Futurological Analysis”, says that by 2035, Beijing hopes to reach parity with Russia and the United States in terms of strategic nuclear arsenals.

Will China and Russia remain what President Putin calls “true friends” in a “no limits” strategic partnership, as Putin and Xi have often vowed? Some over-enthusiastic Western analysts have begun to argue that, given China’s phenomenal rise, Russia may be gradually becoming a Chinese vassal state. Such interpretations are too patronising. 

It is not that Russia is not aware of its vulnerabilities. Andrew Korybko, a Moscow-based American political analyst, writes that Russia is unlikely to grant China the logistical access to its military facilities to counter the perception that Russia is a special friend and, by implication, “an intractable foe of the US”. Demography is on China’s side. The low population density for a country of Russia’s size does have geopolitical risks. Many strategic thinkers believe that demography could be one of the main reasons for Putin to claim parts of Ukraine and Crimea by force. Russia’s current fertility rate is 1.4. 

That means that Russia’s current population of 145 million is likely to reduce to 136 million by the mid-century. The dynamics of the border population, too, are unfavourable to Russia. The Russian side of the China-Russia border has a population of only 4 million people, whereas the Chinese side has 30 million. China may be eyeing the lost territories, which are resource-rich. Moscow may be aware that in the future Beijing may try to encroach on its territories, including the strategically crucial port city of Vladivostok. 

Will China’s second rise lead to a Pax Sinica? Chinese scholars maintain that China has risen peacefully without using its hard power. It has also avoided falling into what Joseph Nye refers to as the Kindleberger Trap, a situation when the leadership vacuum of an emerging power may plunge the world into global depression and conflict.

Beijing also contends that its current power projection has been primarily through its global role in the form of the Belt and Road Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, the Global Governance Initiative, and the Asian Civilisations Dialogue.

Will China seek to recover its lost territories, including Vladivostok? China does have a long memory. It may not have forgotten the humiliating Russian land grab. Ideally, China may hope to recover Vladivostok and other areas without “fire and smoke”. 

Is China likely to act as what Columbia University professor Thomas Christensen calls “the high church of realpolitik in the post-Cold War world”? Sun Tzu argued in The Art of War that the highest form of victory is to defeat an enemy without fighting. But the future seldom emerges as a straight line from the past.